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This paper uses the border effect estimate from a gravity model to assess the 
level of trade integration in agricultural markets between EU, OECD and LDC 
countries,  over  the  1995-2000  period.  The  empirical  analysis  confirms  that 
using a gravity equation derived from theory, in the estimation of the border 
effect,  matters.  A  representative  estimate  of  the  border  effect  shows  that 
crossing a national border into the EU market induces a trade-reduction effect 
by a factor of  13. The border effect increases strongly on passing from trade 
between OECD countries to trade between LDCs. In the observed period the 
access to EU market appears quite stable for trade with other OECD countries, 
whereas it significantly  decreases for trade with  LDC countries. Finally, we 
show that the tariff equivalent implied by the estimated border effects are not 
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The  process  of  trade  liberalization  implied  by  WTO  negotiations,  as  well  as  by 
unilateral initiatives such as Everything But Arms (EBA) of the European Union, has 
increased the demand for studies finalized towards an understanding of the ‘real’ tariff 
structure of countries. This paper contributes to this literature by analyzing the market 
access  in  agriculture  between  developed  and  least  developed  countries  (LDCs).  We 
depart from the recent literature on this subject in that we use an indirect estimation 
approach. Specifically, we estimate the (inverse) level of trade integration between the 
European Union and two very different country groups – the rich OECD and the poor 
LDC – using the gravity-border effect methodology.  
The use of an indirect measure is due to the difficulties in estimating protection by 
direct  measurement.  Indeed,  a  look  at  the  literature  on  the  agricultural  average 
protection of the EU reveals a spread of estimates, ranging from the 40% of Messerlin 
(2001) to the 10% of Gallezot (2003). While these differences can be explained by the 
data used, and the assumptions made in calculation (see Bureau and Salvatici, 2003), 
the evidence associated with direct protection measures remains questionable (Fontagné 
et al., 2004). First, average tariff figures mask a reality based on numerous tariff peaks. 
Secondly, it is quite difficult to include the complex system of preferential agreements, 
developed by many rich countries (notably the EU), in the estimation of average ad 
valorem tariffs. Moreover, zero tariffs and zero quotas do not necessarily mean free 
access due to measures at the border, such technical regulations and others non-tariff 
barriers to trade. This recognition is central to the evaluation of the liberalization level 
of recent initiatives conceding free access to LDCs, such as the Everything But Arms.  
Given these problems, the literature now gives consideration to the possibility of using 
an alternative and indirect measure such as the border effect estimated from gravity 
models. This approach, initiated by McCallum (1995), recently found a solid theoretical 
foundation  in  the  work  of  Anderson  and  van  Wincoop  (2003)  and  Feenstra  (2002, 
2003). The underlying idea is to measure the (inverse) level of integration between two 
countries, comparing their bilateral trade with respect to trade flows taking place within 
their own borders. The estimated border effect shows how much trade within countries 
is  above  international  trade  due  to  cross-border  measures  such  as  tariffs,  technical 
regulations and others border costs.  
In this paper we apply the theoretical gravity model developed by Anderson and van 
Wincoop (2003) to agricultural bilateral trade flows between 13 EU, 10 OECD and 23 
LDC countries, from 1995 through 2000. In the empirical analysis we try to answer two 
main  questions.  First,  does  a  theory  based  gravity  equation  do  a  good  job  in  the 
estimation of the border effect in the agricultural market? Second, is the border effect a 
plausible estimate of market access?  
A parallel concern of the paper is to give some consideration to the likely impact on 
LDCs of the EBA initiative, formally adopted by the EU in February 2001. The EBA 
was  finalized  to  further  improve  market  access  for  LDCs,  extending  existing 
preferences like the ACP and GSP that have already led to quota and duty-free access 
for most exports from the LDCs.
1 Other things being constant, it is quite evident that the 
                                                 
1 Specifically, the EBA extends the existing preferences to 919 new tariff lines (HS-8 digit). However, 
duty and quota free access have immediate effects (March 2001) for only 876 tariff lines. Instead 43 other   4 
effect of EBA on the LDCs tends to be proportional to the real tariff cuts, that ultimately 
depend on the actual tariff structure (see Yu and Jensen, 2003). However, it is also 
important to recognize that the EU market access for LDCs will also depend on all the 
other measures at the border that are not explicitly affected by the EBA initiative, such 
as rules of origin, quota administration (for sensitive products), regulations, standards 
and, more in general, non-tariff barriers to trade. Thus, a preliminary estimate of the 
tariff  equivalent  of  these  border  barriers  could  offer  some  new  insight  into  the 
evaluation of EBA type initiatives. 
Finally, our analysis is linked to a growing literature that uses gravity type models to 
analyze different features of agricultural trade costs. Recent examples in this direction 
deal with the effect of food safety standards on bilateral trade (see Otsuki and Wilson, 
2001;  Otsuki  et  al.  2001;  Nardella  and  Boccaletti,  2003),  the  estimation  of  tariff 
equivalents of non-tariff barriers (Dihel and Walkenhorst, 2002), the impact of distance 
on US agricultural export (Wang et al. 2000), the effect of exchange rate uncertainty 
(Cho et al. 2002) and of tariff and non-tariff barriers on agricultural trade (Haveman and 
Thursby, 2002). However, till now, the use of a theoretical gravity equation to infer the 
border effects in agricultural trade has never been applied.
2 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes the structure of the model and 
derives a theoretical gravity equation. Section 3 describes the data sources and variables 
used in the empirical model. Section 4 is devoted to the presentation of our empirical 
results. The final section discusses the main implications and our conclusions.     
 
2. The gravity-border effect approach  
 
The gravity-border effects approach starts with the puzzle finding of McCallum (1995). 
This author found that trade between a pair of Canadian provinces was much greater 
than trade between a Canadian province and a U.S. state, even accounting for distance 
and size. The differences was so large – a factor of 20 (= 2000%!) – that it throws into 
doubt the view that international markets have become relatively well integrated.  
Since then, a large body of literature is emerged  to explain the underline reasons of this 
apparent puzzle (see, e.g., Helivell, 1998; Wei, 1996; Wolf, 2000, Head a Mayer, 2002; 
and many others). Up to now, the more convincing explanation of the border effect 
puzzle come from the work of Anderson and van Wincoop (2003).  
These  authors  show  that  the  McCallum  finding  is  a  combination  of  two  main 
distortions: First, an asymmetry effects of the border effect on countries of different 
size; and, more importantly, a miss-specification of the standard gravity equation with 
respect to what the gravity theory tell us. More specifically, the recognition that the 
existence  of  trade  costs,  such  as  transports  costs  and  trade  policies,  induce  price 
differences across countries. Thus, a consistent estimation of the gravity equation must 
to take account of these ‘price effects’.  
 
 
                                                                                                                                               
sensitive tariff lines will come into being in three progressive stages before the end of July 2009. The 
main sensitive product groups are sugar, rice and bananas (European Community, 2001). 
2 The only paper that specifically have applied the gravity-border effects approach to agricultural markets 
is that of Furtan and Blain (2004). However, their gravity specification is not based on a theoretical 
gravity model.     5 
2.1 Theoretical background  
 
Our  main  goal  consists  of  the  estimation  of  a  bilateral  trade  model  with  a  gravity 
specification  derived  from  theory.  Anderson  and  van  Wincoop  (2003)  recently 
demonstrated that a proper derivation of the gravity equation from theory is crucially 
important to the validity of empirical results, and this is especially true in the case of 
border effect estimation. A gravity equation can be derived from a variety of different 
theories.  In  this  paper  we  follow  Deardoff  (1998)  and  Anderson  and  van  Wincoop 
(2003) who specify a model based on the Hecksher-Ohlin theory. Because our focus is 
on  agricultural  bilateral  trade,  this  perfect  competition  framework  appears  more 
appropriate for modeling such trade than imperfect competition models.  
The model assumes that each country is specialized in the production of a single good. 
Combining CES utility with ‘iceberg’ trade costs (proportionality of trade costs with 
respect to quantity of trade), and assuming symmetric trade costs, the model yields the 











































P           (2). 
 
In equation (1) Xij denotes the import of i from j, Yi and Yj are levels of gross output (or 
GDP),  Y
w  is  world  output  and  tij  are  the  trade  costs  (equal  to  one  plus  the  tariff 
equivalent of all trade costs). Moreover, s > 0 is the elasticity of substitution between 
goods, and Pi and Pj are the so called ‘multilateral resistance indices’ that summarize 
the average trade resistance between a country and its trading partners. Finally, qj = Yj / 
Y
w is the country share of world output.  
As  in  the  traditional  gravity  equation,  trade  depends  positively  on  the  size  of  each 
country and negatively on the trade barriers. However, the key implication of equation 
(1) is that bilateral trade depends on relative trade barriers, namely the bilateral barrier 
tij divided by the product of their ‘multilateral resistance indices’ Pi and Pj. Thus, the 
gravity  equation  suggests  that  trade  between  two  regions,  after  controlling  for  size, 
depends on the bilateral barrier between them, in relation to the average trade barriers 
that both regions face with all their trading partners. The interpretation is, as Anderson 
and van Wincoop (2003) suggest, quite intuitive: ‘the more resistant to trade with all 
others a region is, the more it is pushed to trade with a given bilateral partner’. 
Before deriving an estimable equation, there is the modeling of the unobservable trade 
cost function tij. Following other authors, we assume that the trade cost factor tij is a 
loglinear  function  of  two  observable  types  of  costs:  (i)  non-border  cost  proxy  by 
bilateral distance dij, and (ii) whether there is an international border between i and j: 
 
         
ij b d t ij ij
d r =           (3) 
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where b is one plus the tariff equivalent of all the trade barriers associated with the 
border, and dij is equal to zero when two regions are located in the same country (intra-
country-trade) and equal to 1 for cross-border or international trade.  
Finally, it is very useful to separate the border costs b into those that generate rents and 
those which do not generate rents (Anderson and van Wincoop, 2002). Rent-border 
costs  are  related  to  international  trade  policy  such  as  tariffs,  quotas  and  technical 
regulations, and lead to rents for government and/or private beneficiaries. Such costs 
depend on the level of protection of the country i, and consist of an ad valorem tariff tij 
and the ad valorem equivalent of non-tariff barriers ntbij  
 
 
) 1 )( 1 ( ij ij rent ntb b + + = t         (4). 
 
 
On the contrary, most border barriers result from factors unrelated to trade policy, and 
so  do  not  generate  rents.  Such  barriers  are  due  to  transaction  costs  generated  by 
differences in language, culture, regulations, history, institutions and are, in most cases, 
more  difficult  to  remove.  In  empirical  studies  such  non-rent-border  costs  are,  for 
example,  proxy  by  using  linguistic  ties  and  contiguity  dummy  variables  to  capture 
information costs, the costs of writing any necessary contracts and the level of both 
formal and informal networks (see Evans, 2003).  
The distinction between rent and non-rent border costs is important when the researcher 
uses the results of the estimated gravity model to do welfare analysis, as in Anderson 
and van Wincoop (2002). However, also in our more modest empirical exercise this 
distinction  will  be  useful  in  estimating  the  tariff  equivalent  of  tariffs  and  non-tariff 
barriers for the country groups involved in our model. 
 
2.2 Empirical specification 
 
Moving the output terms, Yi and Yj, from the right to the left of equation (1), to take 
account of the endogenity of gross output, and replacing the trade costs factor with (3), 
yields the following logarithmic form of the theoretical gravity equation: 
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In the estimation of a theory driven gravity equation the main problem is to take account 
of the unobservable multilateral resistance factors Pi and Pj . To this end the literature 
proposes three main, but different, approaches: the use of price index such as consumer 
price index (CPI) to measure the price effects in the gravity equation, as in Baier and 
Bergstrand (2001) and Fontagné at al. (2004), the use of non-linear least squares to 
solve the system of equations (1) and (2) as in Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) and, 
finally, the replacement of multilateral resistance terms with country dummies as in 
Hummels (2001) and Feenstra (2002). As recently shown by the last author, only the   7 
two latter approaches lead to consistent estimates
3, but while the former of these is more 
complex (and more efficient), the use of the fixed effect method is preferable due to its 
simplicity, since the estimation can be performed with ordinary least squares. Thus we 
will run our key estimations using the fixed effects for source and destination countries. 
That is to say, by adding a constant k, and introducing the border coefficient g equal to 
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where  fi  is  a  dummy  variable  indicating  whether  country  i  is  the  importer,  and  fj 
another dummy variable indicating if country j is the exporter. Then the coefficients 
b1
i=(1-  s)lnPi  and b2
j=(1-  s)lnPj  will  be  an  estimate  of  the  multilateral  indexes.  In 
equation (6) the key parameters to be estimated, other than the fixed effects, are the 
constant k, the distance coefficient r(1- s), and the border effect coefficient g = (1-
s)lnb.
4 
We apply the above equation to bilateral trade flows of 46 countries: 13 EU, 23 LDCs 
and 10 (non EU) OECD countries observed over 6 years (1995-2000). We assume that 
border barriers b may differ for EU-EU trade, EU-OECD trade, EU-LDC trade, and also 
in both OECD-OECD and LDC-LDC trade. Thus, we will estimate five different border 
coefficients g.  
Finally it is important to highlight that, due to the assumption of symmetric trade costs 
tij = tji underlying the theoretical structure of the model, we have to interpret the tariff 
equivalent implied by the border effects estimate to be a trade-weighted average of the 
barriers  in  both  directions.  Indeed,  the  symmetric  assumption  does  not  imply  that 
empirically tij = tji, because there are many equilibria with asymmetric barriers that lead 
to the same equilibrium trade flows as with symmetric barriers (see Anderson and van 
Wincoop, 2003).  
 
 
3. Data and measures 
 
Our gravity model includes 10 OECD, 23 LDCs and 13 EU countries (see Appendix 
1).
5 The database considers the imports of the EU countries from all other countries 
over the period 1995-2000 (13 x 46 x 6), plus bilateral trade flows existing within LDCs 
and OECD countries. As a result the data set  we use is not ‘square’ because some 
countries have more partners than others, and presents a total of 4,878 observations. 
Those  observations  consider  almost  40%  of  world  agricultural  trade  flows  for  the 
period. 
                                                 
3 A problem in using the published prices index to measure the multilateral resistant terms is that these 
indexes may not accurately reflect the true border effects (see Feenstra, 2002). Moreover, price indexes 
such as CPI also include non-tradables and are affected by local taxes and subsidies.  
4 Note that the elasticity of substitution s, because it is always in a multiplicative form with trade cost 
parameters, is not identified. 
5 The observations on Belgium and Luxembourg are not considered due to a large zero value.   8 
The needed data involve primarily bilateral trade and production data in a comparable 
industry classification. The trade data come from the World’s Agricultural Trade Matrix 
(WATM) made by FAO. These trade data are detailed official data, reported by the 
country of origin (for imports) and the country of destination (for exports). We consider 
here the data reported by the importer countries, with the exception of shipments from 
EU  to  LDC  countries,  where  we  use  the  European  countries  exports  declarations 
because of great lack of LDC declaration data. Summary figures for this bilateral trade 
flow are given in Appendix 1. 
Like  most  databases  on  bilateral  trade,  the  WATM  lacks  observations  when  trade 
equalled zero or when it fell below a reporting threshold. Following Zahniser et al. 
(2002),  to  ensure  that  these  observations  do  not  drive  the  results,  a  country’s 
observations are included only if there are at least four non-zero data during the 1995-
2000 period. Moreover, following Chen (2004), we express the dependent variables as 
ln(1+Xij), so that for high levels of trade flow ln(1+Xij) @ ln(Xij) and when Xij = 0, 
ln(1+Xij) = 0 also.  
Although the database covers over 600 food and agriculture commodities, we consider 
here only the aggregate trade flow of 198 agricultural products.
6 This selection allows 
us  to  include  in  the  database  many  developing  countries  whose  data  on  food  and 
agricultural production values, required by the model, would not normally be present. 
On  the  other  hand  it  is  easier  to  find,  from  the  same  data  source,  the  agricultural 
production value. Thus, the agricultural production data and the trade flow data have a 
fully comparable classification. Indeed, the output data come from the FAO Statistical 
Database  (FAOSTAT  CD)  where  the  same  198  agricultural  product  codes  are 
considered.
7 
The  empirical  implementation  of  equation  (6)  needs  intra-country  trade  data.  For 
example,  McCallum  (1995)  uses  Canadian  province-level  data  to  show  that  trade 
between two Canadian provinces is about twenty times as large as their trade with the 
American states. However, we do not have this figure on intra-country trade for our 
country sample. Thus, as is common in this literature, country’s ‘imports’ from itself, 
are calculated as in Wei (1996). Such imports are defined as the difference between 
total agricultural production and total export to the rest of the world. Both data come 
from the same FAO source described above. However, while the trade flow data are in 
current US$, the agricultural production value are in constant (1989-91) international $.  
Thus, for comparability purposes, the production data have been converted to current 
US$ using parity between international $ and US$, for the base period 1989-91, and the 
American CPI. 
Moreover, we need measures of distance between and within countries. We use the 
intra-national distance estimate, recently proposed by CEPII. This distance database has 
the considerable advantage of making internal distance constructions consistent with 
international distance calculations. Note that as it is evident from the specification of 
trade costs (3), and as shown empirically by Head and Mayer (2002), any overestimate 
of the internal distance relative to the external one will mechanically translate into an 
overestimate of the border effect. 
                                                 
6 The share of those agricultural commodities on total agri-food trade is 80% for the 23 selected LDC 
exports and 40% for the OECD exports to the EU. 
7 The 198 selected item codes represent agricultural raw material, while the other 355 codes consider 
processed agricultural items, like beverages, cheeses, cigarettes, etc.   9 
Various measures of intra-national distances have been computed in the literature. For 
example, Wei (1996) and Wolf (2000) employ fractions of distances to the centers of 
neighbor countries.  In the new CEPII database, the calculation is based on bilateral 
distances between cities weighted by the share of the city in the overall population of 
the country. This procedure is used for both internal and international distances.    
Finally,  as  in  the  previous  literature,  we  take  into  account  also  whether  or  not  two 
countries share a common border, a common language, and common colonial histories. 
Thus,  three  dummy  variables  are  included  in  some  specifications.  The  first  two 
dummies take value 1 when country i and country j speak a common language and/or 
share a common border (0 otherwise).  The third one, the colonial dummy, is equal to 1 




4.1 Base model vs. fixed effects 
 
Table  1  reports  ordinary  least  squares  regressions  (OLS)  of  different  specifications 
based on the gravity equation (6), pooled over the 1995-2000 period. For comparison 
purposes, we also report two traditional a-theoretic specifications (base model) where 
the estimation does not take account of the multilateral trade resistances implied by the 
theory.   
The first column reports the results of estimating a McCallum type gravity equation, 
that allows for non-unitary output elasticity. The overall fit of this regression, equal to 
0.53, is in line with the usual findings in gravity literature, confirming the ability of the 
gravity equation to explain bilateral trade flow. All the estimated coefficients have the 
expected  sign  and  are  highly  significant  (p  <  0.01).  The  importer  and  exporter 
production elasticity, equal to 0.94 and 0.93 respectively, are both near the unitary value 
predicted by the theory. The coefficient on distance, around –1.0, is also comparable 
with the usual findings, with coefficients ranging from –1.2 to –0.6.  
In this basic specification, the estimated border effects are all particularly large. For 
example, considering the estimated border coefficients between the EU countries, this 
means that intra-country trade is, on average, about 103 (= exp (4.63)) times larger than 
the cross-border EU trade. A comparable estimate for agricultural trade does not exist. 
However, Fontagné et al. (2004), for all manufactured goods, finds an intra EU border 
effect ranging from 20 in the late seventies to 13 in the late nineties. Moreover on 
comparing the magnitude of the border coefficients between different country-group 
combinations, a clear inconsistency emerges with respect to the a-priori expectations. 
For example, the average border effect between LDCs is lower than the average border 
effect of intra-EU trade. These results appear inconsistent with the zero tariff and zero 
non-tariff  barriers  implied  by  the  European  Common  market,  especially  when 
associated with the high tariff protection of LDCs (see Gibson et al. 2001).  
The specification in column (2) extends the basic gravity model by constraining the 
coefficients on production terms at unity. By doing this the potential endogeneity in 
production is accounted for. However controlling for production endogeneity does not 
substantially  change  the  magnitude  of  the  border  coefficients,  that  remain  large. 
However, it does induce a slight reduction in the overall fit of the regression, a result 
very close to the findings of Anderson and van Wincoop (2003).    10 
In column (3) we include fixed effects for source and destination countries, to check for 
the  unobserved  multilateral  resistance  indices  implied  by  the  theory.  Comparing 
columns  (3)  and  (2)  shows  that  this  theoretical  modification  strongly  reduces  the 
estimated border coefficients in all but the LDC-LDC combinations where, differently, 
the border coefficient increases. Now the estimated border effects are more in line with 
previous findings. First of all, the lower border effect is detected for intra EU country 
trade. Thus, the level of trade integration among EU countries is higher than the other 
combinations considered here. Crossing a national border inside the EU reduces trade 
by  a  factor  of  13.5  (=  exp  (2.60)),  a  very  close  figure  with  the  13.2  estimation  of 
Fontagné et al. (2004) in the period 1996-1999.  
Second, the LDCs show a very low level of integration with other LDC countries. Here, 
the cross border trade is 90 times lower than their intra-country trade. This border effect 
is  impressively  large,  but  consistent  with  the  existing  estimates  in  other  developing 
countries  (see  Helliwell,  1998;  de  Sousa  and  Lochard,  2003).  On  the  contrary  the 
average  level  of  integration  between  LDCs  and  EU  countries  seems  substantially 
higher, and of the same order of magnitude as that between EU and OECD countries. In 
these two cases the cross border trade is 26 times lower than intra-country trade.  
Overall, these results confirm that using a gravity equation derived from theory, in the 
estimation  of  border  effects,  matters.  Indeed,  a-theoretic  gravity  equation  strongly 
inflates the border effect estimate, that suffers an omitted variable bias, as discussed in 
section (2). 
Column (4) adds two variables found to be important in earlier work (see, Wei, 1996; 
Helliwell,  1997):  contiguity  and  the  use  of  common  language.  We  follow  Wei  in 
interpreting these variables, namely ‘how much more intensely does a country trade 
with  itself  than  with  another  country  with  which  it  shares  a  common  border  and  a 
common  language?’.  As  can  be  seen  both  variables  have  a  positive  and  significant 
coefficient. Thus, two countries speaking the some language tend to trade 156% (= exp 
(0.94)-1) more with each other than otherwise, while sharing a land border has a slightly 
lower impact.  
The  inclusion  of  the  language  and  contiguity  dummies  reduces  the  average  border 
effects in all but the LDC-LDC combinations. Thus, the results suggest that sharing a 
common border and a common language, partially explains why trade is more prevalent 
between national borders than across borders. These two variables explain between 35-
55% of the border effect, with the higher value related to intra EU trade, and the lower 
one to EU-LDC trade. However this is not the case of LDC-LDC combination. The 
different effects of the two dummies on passing from EU-EU trade to LDC-LDC trade, 
simple suggests that these dimensions are not key elements in determining the strong 
border effect of LDC countries. In LDCs features such as insecurity associated both 
with contractual enforcement and with corruption (see Anderson and Marcouller, 2002), 
probably  are  dominant  with  respect  to  the  dimension  captured  by  language  and 
contiguity dummies.  
Finally, the last column of table 1 adds a dummy which is equal to 1 if country i has 
ever colonized j or vice versa. Its estimated coefficient is positive and highly significant, 
suggesting that ex-ante colonies trade more with their colonizers. As in our data set the 
colonial dummy is equal to one, especially in EU-LDC country pairs, it is not surprising 
that its inclusion especially affects this border coefficient.  
Our main concern does not lie in explaining border effects in agricultural trade, a very 
important  topic  for  further  research,  but  in  using  the  estimated  parameters  to  better   11 
understand  their  potential  implications  from  a  market  access  perspective.  However, 
before doing that, let us look at the time variation in border effects.  
 
4.2 Time variation in border effects 
 
Table  2  and  figure  1  analyze  the  evolution  of  the  border  effects  over  the  observed 
period. In table 2 the regressions are estimated pooling the data over three different time 
periods: 1995-96, 1997-98 and 1999-2000. From table 2 we first note that our estimated 
equation  is  quite  stable  across  the  years,  although  the  border  coefficients  show  a 
generalized tendency to increase on passing from the 1995-96 period to the 1997-98. 
Then in the last period the border coefficients remain quite constant and, in some cases, 
decrease. A better picture of the time variation in border effects is given in figure 1, 
where we plot their year to year variation. As can be seen, all but one border effect 
combination show a rather smooth and regular evolution, with a slight border effect 
increase, especially in the first half of the period. Excluding from the discussion the 
trade combination EU-LDC, to which we return later, it is quite difficult to draw strong 
conclusions  from  this  little  increase  in  border  effects,  due  to  the  short  time  period 
involved. However, note that these results are not inconsistent with the implementation 
of the Marrakech agreement, where the OECD average agricultural protection does not 
show a substantial reduction when measured with respect to trade with other developed 
countries (see Boüet et al. 2003).
8 
However, this last conjecture is more difficult to apply to the sharp increase in the EU-
LDC  border  effect,  evident  in  figure  1.  In  fact,  the  actual  estimate  of  the  average 
protection of EU import from LDCs tends to decrease during the 1995-2000 period (see 
Gallezot, 2003; Boüet et al. 2003). A potential explanation of this border effect jump 
could be found in the difficulty encountered by LDCs to meet the stringent sanitary and 
phitosanitary measures and product standards of the EU market, a hypothesis consistent 
with recent empirical evidence (see, e.g., Henson et al, 1999; Otsuki et al. 2001; Olper 
and Banterle, 2002; Unctad, 2003). If this interpretation is correct, it casts some doubts 
on the real value of market access concessions given to LDCs, because the increases in 
these border barriers could erodes the actual preferential margin. 
 
4.3 Policy-related border barriers: a tentative evaluation 
 
The border effects discussed above represent all-inclusive border barriers and can be 
usefully  split  into  policy-related  (or  rent)  and  policy-unrelated  (or  non-rent)  border 
costs (see section 2.1). Although an attribution of the effects of these two components it 
is not a trivial task, a preliminary and rough division could provide useful information 
on  the  economic  significance  of  these  different  effects  (see  Evans,  2003).  Thus,  to 
evaluate the contribution of policy-related border barriers, we use the  results of the 
preceding section, making the assumption that intra EU border effect is a lower bond 
estimation of policy-unrelated border costs, due to the zero tariffs and zero non-tariff 
                                                 
8 There are different conceptual difficulties in the estimation of the average protection implied by the 
Uruguay Round implementation (see the discussion in Boüet et al. 2003). However, there is a widespread 
suspicion that tariff, as an effect of the tariffication process, could be increased.    12 
barriers  implied  by  the  Common  Market  since  1993.
9  Then,  to  estimate  the  policy-
related component of the border costs of the others trade combinations, we subtract 
from their absolute border coefficients the absolute border coefficient of the EU. Table 
3 reports the results. 
The first three columns calculate the total implied ad valorem tariff equivalent of border 
effects  [ ] ( ) ) 1 /( exp s g - = , using the border coefficients g estimated in regressions from 
3 to 5 of table 1, and a range of reasonable values of substitution elasticity s of 3, 5 and 
8 respectively. Those tariff equivalents are all-inclusive border barriers and are clearly 
sensitive  to  substitution  elasticity.  Instead  columns  from  4  to  6  report  the  tariff 
equivalent of policy-related border barriers obtained as described above. Finally, for 
comparability  purposes,  the  last  column  reports  some  representative  estimates  of 
average (direct) tariff rates taken from previous studies.
10  
Let us focus the discussion on an intermediate value of s = 5. 
The  all-inclusive  average  tariff  equivalents  for  trade  between  developed  countries 
ranges from 56% for intra EU trade to 125% for EU-OECD trade. These values are 
some what higher than the results of previous studies based on OECD countries and all 
manufactured  goods, ranging from 45% to 116% (see table 7 of Anderson and van 
Wincoop 2004, survey). Though these differences are in line with the higher level of 
protection that characterizes agricultural vs. manufactured goods in OECD, the tariff 
equivalent of border barriers are far higher than recognized tariff barriers, suggesting 
that transaction costs and non-distortionary barriers are substantial. In other words, in 
relation  to  our  hypothesis,  the  results  show  that  policy-unrelated  border  barriers 
dominate trade policy, as suggested by Anderson and van Wincoop (2002) and Evans 
(2003).  
For the same elasticity  value s = 5, policy-related border barriers show an average 
bilateral tariff equivalent that ranges from 2.5% for OECD trade to 99% for LDC trade, 
with intermediate value for EU trade with OECD and LDC ranging from 18% to 36% 
(see column 5). To give sense to these figures the reader is reminded that the policy-
related border barrier is the sum of two things: the ad valorem tariff plus the ad valorem 
equivalent of non-tariff barriers. Thus our tariff equivalents estimate will be realistic 
only if their value are higher than (or close to) the average tariff rates reported in the last 
column of table 3. As can be clearly seen this happens in almost all the cases reported 
there, independently of the choice of the elasticity of substitution. The only systematic 
inconsistency appears to be the estimated equivalent tariffs for trade between OECD 
                                                 
9 Indeed, the process of harmonization or mutual recognition in standards and other regulations implied 
by the Common market, does not actually find equality around the world. Moreover, as suggested by 
Evans (2003: 1306), ‘EU membership implies both a reduction in trade restriction and the creation of 
supranational  government  institutions  and  policies,  that  go  beyond  the  scope  of  any  single  national 
government and beyond what would be implied by completely free trade among independent nations’. 
10 Because the estimated tariff equivalent of border effects are weighed average bilateral tariffs between 
each country trade combinations, the average tariffs reported in the last column of table 3 are computed 
starting from ‘representative’ bilateral tariffs, weighted by our trade figures (see appendix). For example, 
to estimate the EU-LDC average bilateral tariff we start from an average 1995-2000 duty on EU imports 
from LDCs of 4% (see Gallezot, 2003; Boüet et al., 2003: table yy). Then we assign a tariff of 45% to 
LDC import from EU, starting from Gibson et al. (2001) tariff estimate on LDCs. Finally, using our trade 
figures as a weight, we have an average bilateral tariff of 9.3%[=(4%*0.87)+(45%*0.13)]. A similar 
procedure was applied to EU-OECD and OECD-OECD combinations, starting from bilateral tariff taken 
from Boüet et al. (2003: table yy and ttt).  
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countries that, especially for high elasticity value, show implied tariff equivalents that 
are too low.  
The  equivalent  tariffs  of  policy-related  border  barriers  show  some  what  different 
patterns and magnitude when calculated using the results from regression 3, instead of 
those  of  regressions  4  and  5.  The  reason  for  this  is  that  we  put  forward  different 
hypotheses concerning the ‘assigned’ weight to policy-unrelated border costs. Indeed, in 
using results from regression 3 we make the hypothesis that non-rent border costs are 
the  same  in  each  country  trade  combinations,  and  equal  to  that  of  intra  EU  trade. 
Instead, in using the results from regressions 4 and 5, where we have ruled out the effect 
of language, contiguity and colonial ties, we make the assumption that these dummies 
have the same effect in each country combinations, a hypothesis out of our data. Indeed, 
as shown in section 4.1 those dummies induce a stronger reduction in the border effect 
of intra EU trade. Thus, the tariff equivalent estimated from the results of regressions 4 
and 5 are probably biased upward. However, no speculation is made on this point as the 
calculations provide only same preliminary rough numbers.       
Now, let us go a step further. If we take the ratio between the equivalent tariff of policy-
related  border  barriers  and  average  tariffs,  we  have  an  estimate  of  the  ad  valorem 
equivalent  of  non-tariff  barriers  (see  equation  (4)).  For  example,  using  results  of 
regression 3 and s = 5, the implied non-tariff barrier is equal to 11% (= 1.61 / 1.45), 8% 
(= 1.18 / 1.09) and 2% (= 1.18 / 1.15) tariff for LDC-LDC, EU-LDC and EU-OECD 
trade,  respectively.  Thus,  our  rough  estimation  of  the  tariff  equivalent  of  non-tariff 
barriers  shows  that  they  especially  affect  trade  from  LDC  to  other  LDC  or  to  EU 
countries. A result consistent with common belief. 
Obviously, making different assumptions leads to different figures, but this does not 
change the qualitative message of the results. For example, all the above results are 
quite  sensitive  to  the  import  elasticity  of  substitution,  s.  Increasing  this  elasticity 
decreases the estimated tariff equivalent of the border barriers, and vice versa. Though 
there is no good guidance on the correct value of s, Hummels (2001) shows that the 
elasticity  of  substitution  depends  on  the  disaggregation  of  industries,  with  elasticity 
increasing from around 4 to 7 on passing from 1 to 3 digit industry, respectively. Thus, 
an average value of s = 5 is not necessarily implausible for our data.  
 
 
6. Concluding remarks 
 
In this paper we apply the theoretical gravity model developed by Anderson and van 
Wincoop (2003) to agricultural bilateral trade flows between rich and poor countries. 
The empirical analysis investigates the level of market access among different country-
‘bloc’ combinations through the border effect approach, that is to say through all the 
factors that contribute to a country’s internal trade volume deviation from the gravity 
model prediction. The analysis strongly confirms that a proper derivation of the gravity 
equation from theory matters in estimating border effects . 
A representative estimate of border effect in the EU market lies, after controlling for 
economic size, transport costs, language ties etc., between 13 and 6, depending on the 
specifications  (exclusion  or  inclusion  of  language  and  contiguity  dummies, 
respectively). This means that crossing a national border within the EU induces a trade-
reduction  effect  of  the  same  order  of  magnitude.  This  border  effect  increases 
progressively on passing from OECD-OECD trade (15 and 9.6, respectively), to LDC-  14 
LDC trade (90 and 93, respectively). Thus, given the order of magnitude of these border 
costs, their explanation could be a very important topic for further research. Moreover 
the large size of the estimated border barriers in trade between LDC countries, where 
policy  related barriers often matter,  also points  to the need for  an increase in  LDC 
market access.  
In the observed period the border effect remained quite stable for all but the EU-LDC 
combination, showing progressive difficulty for LDC exports to gain market access in 
the  EU  market.  An  explanation  of  this  deterioration  in  the  market  access  of  LDC 
exports  lies  in  the  difficulty  these  countries  have  in  meeting  the  growing  sanitary, 
phitosanitary and technical measures of the EU market. Our tentative estimate of the 
tariff  equivalent  of  non-tariff  barriers  gives  some  credence  to  this  hypothesis.  This 
tendency can markedly reduce the potential benefits of EBA type initiatives because it 
erodes  the  actual  preferential  margin.  Thus,  LDC  countries  should  be  given  more 
assistance to meet the growing standards of the developed world. 
Finally,  given  the  structural  derivation  of  our  gravity  equation,  let  us  force  the 
peculiarity of zero tariff and zero non-tariff barriers of intra EU trade to split the border 
costs into two very different elements: those related to trade policy (rent-border barriers) 
and those unrelated to it (non-rent border barriers). By doing so, we are able to estimate 
the tariff equivalent of policy-related border barriers and the implied non-tariff trade 
barriers, showing that this figures are not implausible when compared to actual tariff 
rates. However, the central point is that non-rent border barriers dominate rent-border 
costs, confirming previous finding. This result has many important implications. For 
example, with regard to the LDC preferential access, it suggests that by retaining the 
benefits  of  a  less  distorted  agricultural  world  market,  it  is  necessary  to  give  such 
countries  more  assistance  to  build  institutions,  infrastructures  and  so  on,  to  reduce  
border costs. Indeed, the potential payoff of such aids appears higher than EBA type 
initiatives, that focus only on trade policies.       
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Table 1. Border effects in the OECD, LDC and European Union countries 
1995-00 1995-00 1995-00 1995-00 1995-00
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Ln Yi 0.94 1 1 1 1
(0.02)
Ln Yj 0.93 1 1 1 1
(0.02)
Ln Distanceij -1.02 -1.06 -1.35 -1.12 -1.14








EU -4.63 -4.70 -2.60 -1.79 -2.18
(0.23) (0.23) (0.25) (0.25) (0.26)
OECD -4.57 -4.56 -2.73 -2.27 -2.55
(0.30) (0.30) (0.31) (0.31) (0.31)
LDC -4.13 -3.86 -4.50 -4.54 -4.86
(0.41) (0.40) (0.35) (0.36) (0.36)
EU            OECD -5.40 -5.41 -3.25 -2.70 -3.03
(0.27) (0.27) (0.25) (0.25) (0.25)
EU            LDC -3.93 -3.76 -3.26 -2.93 -3.41
(0.28) (0.28) (0.27) (0.26) (0.27)
Adj R-square 0.527 0.474 0.755 0.761 0.765
# obs. 4878 4878 4878 4878 4878
Model
Time period




Dependent variable: ln Xij in regression (1); ln (Xij/YiYj) in all other regressions (see text). Robust standard errors are 
in parentheses.  
a Included fixed effect for source and destination countries. 
 







Table 2. Time variation in Border effects over three different time periods 
1995-96 1997-98 1999-2000
Ln Distance ij -1.18 -1.12 -1.14
(0.10) (0.10) (0.10)
Language 0.28 0.29 0.48
(0.21) (0.20) (0.21)
Contiguity 0.83 0.81 0.77
(0.25) (0.24) (0.25)
Colonial dummy 1.66 1.53 1.19
(0.30) (0.28) (0.29)
Border coefficients
EU -2.00 -2.24 -2.28
(0.46) (0.44) (0.45)
OECD -2.51 -2.64 -2.51
(0.56) (0.53) (0.54)
LDC -4.55 -5.27 -4.75
(0.64) (0.61) (0.62)
EU            OECD -2.94 -3.12 -3.02
(0.45) (0.43) (0.44)
EU            LDC -3.17 -3.54 -3.51
(0.48) (0.46) (0.47)
Adj R-square 0.767 0.778 0.768
# obs. 1618 1631 1629






Dependent variable: ln (Xij/YiYj). Robust standard errors are in parentheses (see text).  










Table 3. Estimate of tariff equivalent of border barriers vs. actual tariff rates  
Average 
Tariff
Elasticities 3 5 8 3 5 8
Regression 3
EU 3.67 1.92 1.45
OECD 3.92 1.98 1.48 1.07 1.03 1.02 1.17
LDC 9.49 3.08 1.90 2.59 1.61 1.31 1.45
EU-OECD 5.08 2.25 1.59 1.38 1.18 1.10 1.15
EU-LDC 5.10 2.26 1.59 1.39 1.18 1.10 1.09
Regression 4
EU 2.45 1.56 1.29
OECD 3.11 1.76 1.38 1.27 1.13 1.07 1.17
LDC 9.68 3.11 1.91 3.96 1.99 1.48 1.45
EU-OECD 3.86 1.96 1.47 1.58 1.26 1.14 1.15
EU-LDC 4.33 2.08 1.52 1.77 1.33 1.18 1.09
Regression 5
EU 2.97 1.72 1.37
OECD 3.58 1.89 1.44 1.20 1.10 1.05 1.17
LDC 11.36 3.37 2.00 3.82 1.95 1.47 1.45
EU-OECD 4.55 2.13 1.54 1.53 1.24 1.13 1.15
EU-LDC 5.50 2.35 1.63 1.85 1.36 1.19 1.09
(1 + ad valorem equivalent)
All-inclusive border barriers Policy-related border barriers
 
Notes: see text. 
 






Figure 1. Border effects over time between different trade combinations 
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A. 1 Trade patterns 
 
 
Table 3. EU: total trade and combinations share (1995-2000) 
Total trade EU-EU EU-OECD EU-LDC
(million US$) (%) (%) (%)
1995 33,370 65.9 29.8 4.2
1996 34,784 68.6 27.8 3.5
1997 33,068 67.1 29.1 3.8
1998 32,406 69.4 27.0 3.6
1999 30,198 70.5 26.0 3.5
2000 27,988 67.5 29.1 3.3  
Notes: trade of  13 EU with 13 EU, 10 OECD and 23 LDC countries. 




Table 4. LDC: total trade, combinations and bilateral share (1995-2000) 
Total trade LDC-LDC EU-LDC LDC EU to
 to EU LDC
(million US$) (%) (%) (%) (%)
1995 1,449 2.3 97.7 89.7 10.3
1996 1,261 2.4 97.6 87.3 12.7
1997 1,277 1.6 98.4 89.0 11.0
1998 1,210 2.3 97.7 83.7 16.3
1999 1,070 2.1 97.9 84.6 15.4
2000 943 0.9 99.1 84.1 15.9  
Notes: trade of 23 LDC with 23 LDC and 13 EU countries. 




Table 5. OECD: total trade, combinations and bilateral share (1995-2000) 
Total trade OECD-OECD EU-OECD OECD EU to
 to EU OECD
(million US$) (%) (%) (%) (%)
1995 27,184 63.4 36.6 78.7 21.3
1996 28,949 66.6 33.4 76.5 23.5
1997 29,193 67.0 33.0 74.8 25.2
1998 27,406 68.1 31.9 73.8 26.2
1999 25,785 69.6 30.4 69.2 30.8
2000 26,213 68.9 31.1 72.7 27.3  
Notes: trade of 10 OECD with 10 OECD and 13 EU countries. 
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